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   The neo-colonialism of decolonisation: Katangan secession and the bringing of the Cold 
War to the Congo 
 
 
Whether decolonisation was  a footnote to the ‘real’ Cold War remains an important 
historiographical question, but answering it has not been helped by the fact that the Cold War 
generally, and particularly in Africa, is often misunderstood. The misleading orthodoxy often sees 
the conflict as being primarily a struggle over hard power in which the US reacts defensively to the 
Soviet Union by 'containing' its expansionist aims
i
.1 The crucial thing is to determine which of the 
many elements of the Cold War were particularly important in which particular time period.. Thus 
the idea that the most important  connection between, and key elements of decolonisation and the 
‘real’  Cold War could have been formed by the crucial ideological struggle between the economic 
forces of capitalism and communism and their social and political manifestations (ways of life) has 
often been neglected in Africa. .  Hence the main aim here is to look at the Cold War decolonisation 
linkage and in so doing highlight a neglected element of the decolonisation process, while 
emphasising that the orthodox perception of the Cold War as centered on elements of military 
strategy and reactions to Soviet expansionism should be reconsidered. The idea that ‘containment’  
arose from concepts such as geopolitics and geostrategy does not constitute the essence of the early 
1960s Cold War with the temporary significance of Africa within it. 
For the Kennedy administration, the most significant anti-communist struggle in that phase 
of the Cold War was over newly emerging nations adopting Western capitalism rather than Soviet 
communism. With the short lived Cold War emphasis on the less developed and decolonising 
world,  the Congo placed the US and the UN on the centre of the European decolonisation stage, 
sometimes with significant divisions over what should be involved in the processes by which power 
was transferred. The Congo also produced a complex mix of  African and international forces 
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interacting within and outside the newly independent territory. These are not directly comparable 
with other European territories, even though their indirect importance arguably may nevertheless 
have some general declonisation significance. 
In addition, events in the Congo do not conform to conventional 'patterns' of decolonisation 
and thus, as with alternative Cold War interpretations they are  inconvenient when trying to change 
emphases, or gain fresh insights from an often excellent historiography in English on 
decolonisation.ii2 It is thus important to increase awareness of  how decolonisation interacted with 
the Cold War system during the first half of the 1960s and produced a Cold War policy to Africa 
and to US  relations with the UN which clearly distinguished the Kennedy administration from the 
Johnson oneiii3.  The aim is to link explanations of the ‘real’ African Cold War,   particularly as 
perceived by US African policy makers, to the historical specificities of colonialism and to insert 
the Congo's neo-colonial experiences into explanations of the end of colonial rule. This is important  
during the early 1960s (arguably the crux of decolonisation), when the Kennedy administration’s 
distinctive African policy  exposed the differences between the US and Britain over black African 
decolonisation that were generally absent or beneath the surface under Eisenhoweriv4.Such 
differences essentially involved the neo-colonial elements of decolonisation which were generally 
seen by the Kennedy administration as damaging the Cold War struggle on such an important 
African battlefield as the Congo with its international focus.v 5 
Neo-colonialism is simply used here to mean the continuation of colonial practices, and their 
effects, after independence, which in the Congo centered on the immediate secession of the mineral 
rich province of Katanga with the assistance of Belgian military forces. These neo-colonial 
practices took the particular economic form of arrangements with Tshombe’s Katangan regime over  
greater access to foreign exchange earnings than would have been available from the legitimate 
government’s central bank. This benefitted the commercial operations of the Katangan copper 
industry and its settler employees, along with the European owners  of the financial capital of the 
operating companies as well as the concessionary payments that Tanganyika Concessions  had 
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started receiving under King Leopold. Operationally the export of Katangan copper through Angola 
on the Benguelan Railway (again owned by Tanganyika Concessions), rather than the  route 
nationale through Port Francqui.to the Kasai and Congo rivers was secured by  by the sabotage of 
the railway bridge over the Lubilash River making the railway inoperable until October 1962. Its 
use would have made it more possible for the legitimate Leopoldville government to have collected 
export duties on Katangan copper. The issue of customs revenue was to figure in the controversy 
and Anglo-American differences engendered by how best to bring about the re-integration of 
Katanga.  
An  arguably neo-colonial role was played by both the main operating company, Union 
Minière du Haut Katanga  (UMHK) and by Tanganyika Concessions, the company that had 
originally  provided some capital and respectability along with Société Générale de Belgique given 
the impending absorption of King Leopold’s privately owned lands into the Belgian Congo state in 
1908. In 1960 this situation was still reflected in the unique circumstances in which Western 
capitalism, predominantly European rather than North American, operated in the Congo.
vi
6 The 
exceptionalism lay in the way the colonial Congo state was merged with private enterprise, and the 
link between concessionary companies, holding companies and those extracting the minerals from 
the concessions, .  In effect when Leopold’s fiefdom became part of the colonial state, private 
companies became   partners with the colonial government and metropolitan institutions under 
arrangements which were still in place in 1960. These circumstances meant the financial benefits 
from the copper industry were more at risk with independence. Retaining conrol over their profits 
was facilitated by the secession of Katanga, and the fact that the economic levers of power had 
NOT been transferred to the independent government when it secured political power.  
The differences with other companies operating in Central Africa, like the  British South 
Africa Company, were in part reflected in that the concessions in Southern Rhodesia were 
transferred to the 1930s ‘colonial’ goverrnment, and the transfer  in Northern Rhodesia to the 
independent Zambian government took place on inde pendence in 1964 which did not happen in the   
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Congo.
vii
7 Limiting any Cold War damage arising from charges of neo-colonialism by modifyng 
the nature and post-indepedence profits of European capitalism was  what the ending of Katangan 
secession and Anglo-American disagreements were to be  all about. Arguments about how to 
achieve this key Cold War American goal produced arguments within the US administration, and 
what eventually emerged as policy conflicted with the financial interests of  the Union Minière du 
Haut Katanga and Tanganyika Concessions and their shareholders. The board of UMHK contained 
the chair of Tanganyika Concessions (and 3 other leading Conservative figures) and it was the latter 
company whose profits provided the main financial backing for the governing Conservative 
party
viii
8. The sums were large with the Americans calculating that UMHK had gross monthly 
earnings of $15 million.
ix
9 Of course Tanganyika Concessions owned shares in UMHK, but 
received 40% of the concessionary payments along with t he Comité Spécial du Katanga (CSK) 
while the Compagnie du Katanga (CK) received the other 20%.
x
 10 The CSK had been established 
under Leopold in 1900, but two thirds of it was owned by the colonial government with one third of 
its share portfolio, including its shares in UMHK, belonging to the private Comapgnie du Katanga 
itself an associate of  Société Générale de Belgique.
xi
 11 Crucially  the CSK shareholders, largely 
the colonial government, agreed to dissolve the CSK and transfer one third of its assets to the CK 
leaving the other two thirds to go to the government of  the  Congo which was about to be led by 
Patrice Lumumba. This was contrary to the original plan of the minister in the Congo, Ganshof Van 
der Meersch,
xii
12 who hoped to avoid appointing Lumumba as formateur if a coalition government 
failed to be put together. Thus with the Belgian troops assisting the Katangan secession to maintain 
the colonial economic relationships, the dissolved CSK assets, other than property, did not go to the 
legitimate Congo government and the dividends on these share assets were instead paid to the 
secessionary government of Katanga. 
The difference in the economic relationships  of the colonial Congo state worked 
particularly against a left wing nationalist like Lumumba. That was because, as Charles Waterhouse 
pointed out, European firms in the Congo had to operate without the full rights normally accorded 
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to boards of management because the colonial/independent state as a shareholder had some voting 
rights. 
xiii
13 These were fine when exercised by European capitalists but when on independence a 
Lumumba government would be exercising them, that was a very different matter. The Congo was 
again different in that  the bulk of companies, including small independent ones that operated there, 
had assets held by, and transactions conducted through, a parent holding company eg Société 
Général de Belgique. The Belgian government and  the Belgian Congo government before 
independence had such close relations with these holding companies that personnel were often 
interchanged. Hence the role of Belgian government troops in protecting the companies’ economic 
interests by supporting Katangan secession as soon as  the Congo became independent. The fact that 
their presence was not primarily to protect European civilians, but to protect the secessionary 
regime from possible African resistance to its rule is even more telling.
xiv
14  
A key result of secession in July and the control of foreign exchange was the refusal of 
Tshombe’s government to recognise the central Congo bank whose assets and branches in Katanga 
were eventually seized in August. A National Bank of Katanga was established and decrees issued 
requiring Katangan residents to deposit all foreign exchange earnings in the new institution while 
Katanga also established its own import licensing controls. Prior to independence Katanga ran a net 
surplus on its current  foreign exchange account of 6.5 billion francs which went towards the rest of 
the Congo’s deficit of 5 billion. Although there was a   4 billion deficit on invisibles some foreign 
exchange earnings would likely have been earmarked on independence for whatever proper or 
improper usage by a left wing nationalist like Patrice Lumumba.
xv
 15 The Katangan foreign 
exchange surplus soon ‘disappeared’,  with some  to help finance Tshombe’s armaments and 
mercenaries along with wages for the Katangan gendarmerie and some of it probably to Tshombe’s 
personal Swiss bank accounts. The US government, through the Brussels Embassy, acquired details 
of the Swiss bank accounts of leading African figures (the means by which this was done are 
unclear) both on the left and right of politics in the Congo. Tshombe’s accounts had 43 million 
Belgian francs and 1.6 million Swiss francs which was a sizeable post-independence sum.
xvi
16 
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 The British played an important role in the Congo crisis in ways which revealed a very 
different approach to the normal end of European colonialism .
xvii
17 They also formed  often 
neglected differences  with the Kennedy administration. . The consensus about liberal influences 
and the political dominance of the transfer of power in British high politics has tended to obscure 
the impact of the Congo on assessments of the decolonisation process. It is not to suggest that this 
consensus should be overturned but that the British and Belgian interactions with the Congo should 
generally be seen in a rather  different light   before finalising an overall assessment of 
decolonisation. . The argument here is that neo-colonialism has been ignored and has  prevented  an 
accurate portrayal of Belgian actions and the tacit support of the UN and the British  for them. This 
has occurred precisely because the misperceptions  of the ‘real’ Cold War  have  enabled that 
obfuscation to succeed. In the case of the Congo, as in several other situations, the Cold War 
portrayed in the form of a Soviet geo-political expansionist threat to a strategically important region 
has been invoked to conceal the real threat inherent in communism, and by extension, any radical 
left wing ideology. Moreover the potentially catastrophic actions of a member of the Western 
alliance in defying numerous security council resolutions in order to   make sure an independent 
African nation was unable to throw off the constraints put in place by the economics of  colonial 
capitalism has also been downplayed or ignored. With the UN Secretary General, Dag 
Hammarskjöld, determined to keep the Soviets out of Africa his inaccurate portrayal as a neutral 
UN figure standing between East and West   has been another Cold War distortion.
 xviii
 18 
The Belgians had done little to prepare their African territory for a future as a self-governing 
state until the late 1950s when a start had been made which was an important cause of the Congo’s 
problems on independence. Hence the maintenance of the Western liberal  interpretation of 
decolonisation and ‘nationalism’.19 The first historiographical ‘myth’ of decolonisation in the 
Congo was thus born from the conventional interpretations which see the Congo crisis as 
‘engendered by‘ the precipitate s unwinding of Belgian rule.20 Hence the problems were not linked 
to neo-colonialism nor to any malevolent policies designed to make the independent state 
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subservient to the economic interests of Europeans. The reality was, as realised by the US 
government, that a substantial infrastructure and service provision had been belatedly financed by 
close to 1 billion dollars of debt to bondholders.21 Burdensome payments of the interest servicing 
these loans were to be incurred by the independent state not the colonial or Brussels governments -
unless agreemennts on the contentieux led to the witholding of the transfer of economic assets. The 
neo-colonial incentive would come from ensuring  repayments of debt made by the independent 
government came not from the control of European assets in the Congo by a left wing 
democratically elected regime; nor from increased influence on company boards of directors 
resulting from the replacing of colonial government representatives with those of the new state; nor 
from the legitimate taxes on trade and industry which would soon be withheld from Leopoldville 
and paid to the Katangan government but from the independent government and its African 
subjects. These are the unmentionables associated with the the role of financial capital. 
The second ‘myth’ relevant to neo-colonialism and the Cold War  is that the Belgians 
intervened to restore law and order and protect   Europeans threatened by disorders in the wake of 
the Congolese Army (ANC)  mutiny at Thysville some 100 miles from Leopoldville. The  mutiny 
had been resolved  by Lumumba and Kasavubu with an agreement on 8 July – the day before the 
Belgians announced that additional troops would be sent to strengthen those in the bases at Kitona 
and Kamina (the latter of which was in Katanga). In addition the UK Foreign Office was informed 
that 300-400 Belgian troops had arrived in Elisabethville the day before Tshombe announced 
secession and 2 days before troops arrived in Leopoldville allegedly to deal with the disorders.  
Hence rather than a specific cause producing an important policy,  we have subsequently 
seen some intangible Cold War concepts, some of which (strategy/security) have been used as Cold 
War justifications, allegedly producing a situation that influenced the end of colonial rule. In 
retrospect the specifics in the Congo have assumed the form of ‘chaos’, the spread of which to the 
Central African Federation allegedly had to be prevented because of the  geo-strategic or 
geopolitical importance of Central Africa in the Cold War.22 
 
 Interpretations of decolonisation 
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have rarely taken on board the significance of neo-colonial elements that appeared in parts of 
Central Africa; nor the impact that disagreements over them in the Congo had. 
xix
23  
There was also the murder and suspicious death of key protagonists Patrice Lumumba and 
Dag Hammarskjöld. All in all there was a lot to cover up, or detract attention from, in the Congo, . 
Hence it was not  so much decolonisation being affected by the existence of the Cold War in Africa 
but the Cold War in Africa being used or embellished in order to conceal the neo-colonialism of the 
decolonisation process in the Congo.  This problem has been enhanced in the historiography by the 
obstacles to building up expertise in both Cold War and imperial history.24 At the same time the 
role of the United Nations, as perceived in Washington, was fundamentally altered in Cold War 
foreign policy terms by the Congo. This meant that  the ability of the US to manage the UN as a 
Cold War tool of US foreign policy had evaporated.With it went a reduction in Africa’s importance 
for both decolonisation and the Cold War.  
 The failure to give  the right Cold War emphasis to the economic importance of African 
acceptance of Western capitalism, along with the transfer of political power, was highlighted by the 
Congo where there was a significant opportunity to continue with a neo-colonial relationship.even if 
the use of  an uninvited troop deployment by the former colonial power aroused immediate hostility 
in Africa and the United Nations.25 . Yet achieving the transfer of economic power  as part of the 
transition to independence  proved difficult to arrange in the Congo.The effect of this did  not  so 
much involve  ‘business’ and its influence on governmental decision makers in London and 
Brussels ie trade and commercial operations extracting minerals, as  the roles European owners of 
financial capital. In the Congo European capital faced a greater left wing African nationalist threat 
with much more at stake because of the way in which capital benefitted from Belgian colonial rule 
and would be handicapped by a left wing government inheriting power.26 Such a difficult 
decolonisation situation in the Congo  may have been an exception to the rule, but like many such 
exceptions no less important for general explanations of international phenomena.
xx
27 
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 It has always been the case that the British have generally refused to acknowledge in  any 
every day non-academic discourse the  unmentionable and derogatory attitude of ‘il est capitaliste’ 
that is sometimes found on the continent;28. Only in continental Europe have the economic 
elements of decolonisation been more generally explored outside the realm of ‘high policy’ that 
allegedly dominated foreign and colonial policy decision making in the European capitals of the 
colonial powers.  Even  non-English writers examining the process have done so primarily from the 
perspective of how the possession of overseas territories has had an impact on the changing 
metropolitan economies.
xxi
29 The inconvenient fact for decolonisation in the Cold War was that 
liberal interpretations of Western policy did not look an attractive fit for the particular and often 
unique circumstances of the Congo.  
Politically the May 1960 elections, normally the precursor for transferring power to 
significant African collaborators, had taken place under the Belgian loi fondamentale which 
required a formateur to determine the composition of the new independent government. The 
elections resulted in the Mouvement National Congolais (MNC) of Patrice Lumumba, a radical left 
wing demagogue,30 becoming the largest party, but a long way short of an overall majority (36 of 
137 seats). The minister in the Congo, Ganshof Van der Meersch hope to use  Kasavubu, a rival 
from the Bakongo people,  as formateur  of an anti-Lumumba coalition. Although Kasavubu was 
able to do so without any elected MNC members, other party representatives would not serve 
without Lumumba who would only serve as the head of hs own government.31The impact and 
meaning of these machinations to stop Lu,mumba were noted by the British consul Ian Scott, who 
became the first UK ambassador to the Congo and was critical of Belgian colonial policy..32 It 
seems reasonable to conclude that even before the surrendering of political power, many individuals 
and political and commercial groups in Brussels and Leopoldville, if not London, were  hoping, or 
expecting, that the essentials of the colonial economic relationship would not be disrupted by the 
transfer of political power.    
10 
 
10 
 
From the Brussels government’s point of view the Belgian Congo's foreign exchange 
earnings (from Katanga) were, apart  from 1 year, covering the metropolitan country's payments 
deficit which thus added to the colony's importance for the Belgian government.33 The first 
payments on the loans taken out by the colonial government would be due shortly after 
independence and were expected to absorb 23% of ordinary Congo budget expenditures. The gap 
between revenue and expenditure produced under colonialism by the debt would require an 
International Bank of Reconstruction and Development loan of $180 million to bridge.
 
 
xxii
34  
In addition the transfer of the economic rights of the colonial state, with their linkage to 
private companies notably the Comité Spécial du Katanga, were not intended to take place 
immediately on the transfer of political  power but be a matter for negotiation with assets being 
handed over in a trade off for assuming debt  through the contentieux. The prospect of a left wing 
nationalist like Lumumba using those companies, directly or indirectly, to  alleviate that debt  
became a distinct possibility once the formateur had been finally been assigned. e and thus the 
economic incentives to retain the  colonial economic structures remained significant. The political 
means by which  to guarantee the financial interests of the Belgian investors and pro-imperial 
groups in Brussels and  the Congo along with the returns on British capital which were important 
for the finances of the British Conservative party thus had to be found.35  
There were by  early 1960 a number of different other balls in play to stop Lumumba - 
which went back to the days before his electoral success. The Americans were aware that Moise 
Tshombe, the African tribal political leader and his party CONAKAT from the mineral rich 
Katanga, had been planning the secession of that province as advocated by settler groups  ‘anxious 
to maintain as much control as possible’ with the possibility of separating the province from the rest 
of the country. The problem was that Tshombe’s CONAKAT party, described by the US 
ambassador to Belgium as ‘an instrument of European interests’, was at odds with the Balubas from 
Haut Lomami in Katanga whose numbers  had been increased by the arrival of Balubas from Kasai 
to work on the railways and in the copper mines. The Balubas were against separatism and the 
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BALUBAKAT was the main political opposition to Tshombe. Major ethnic and political strife 
culminated in March 1960 in serious riots in the urban areas of the copper producing region of 
Southern Katanga, Although the British always portrayed Katanga as an ocean of stability it was 
deeply divided which was why the sending of Belgian troops to support secession in July was so 
needed and such an important element of the neo-colonialism on independence. 
xxiii
36 And there 
was another possibility of Katanga joining the Central African Federation under Roy Welensky, 
also at the instigation of Belgian settlers, which would unite the copper producing regions of 
Northern Rhodesia with Katanga.
xxiv
37 The State Department indicated that 'if this particular 
province were to separate from the rest of the Congo with European support, it might prevent the 
depreciation of mining investments in this region which might be a desirable objective from our 
point of  view'.
xxv
38 European investors in British and Belgian enterprises in the Congo and some 
members and former members of the Belgian governments in Leopoldville and Brussels were soon 
to make the same argument about the value of investments more forcefully. The issue was whether 
Washington would  support the interests of the mining investors or the broader interests of the 
African Cold War.   
Once the  Kennedy administration took power in Washington in 1961, the Cold War centred   more 
and more on winning over the African elites in newly independent states to the Western world.39.  
Making capitalism an attractive proposition for newly independent nations  in ‘Africa for the 
Africans’ was  what  the Anglo-American disagreements over the future of the Congo’s post-
independence economic and political structures were all about.  Under Eisenhower, the opportunity 
arose of  uing the anti-Soviet Cold War western bias to conceal this as the consequences of Belgian 
neo-colonial actions became clearer following the Thysville  mutiny of Congolese soldiers against 
their Belgian officers on the night of 5-6 July.
xxvi
40  With some disorder and stories of rape and 
pillage by the mutinous soldiers, this was used to  justify  the despatch of Belgian troops. Pierre 
Wigny the Belgian foreign minister thus lost no opportunity to portray the Congo mutiny as the 
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result of a communist plot. The implication was that  a left wing government was susceptible to 
such phenomena and US attention might have a better focus .
xxvii
41  
According to the Foreign Office, troops, presumably from Kamina in Katanga province, 
began arriving in Elisabethville prior to the announcement of secession on 11 July which was 
justified because of a 'neo-communist Congo government in Leopoldville'.
xxviii
42 As with many 
Cold War situations the actual threat to the Western socio-economic status quo presented by radical 
non-communist left wing ideas and movements was best presented under the guise of a more 
extreme communist threat and if possible the expansionist goals of the Soviet state - however 
unrelated to the African reality the latter might be.
xxix
43  The real reason was to enable seccession 
to embody the continuing colonial relationship between European capital and a Congo state headed 
by willing African collaborators in the form of Moise Tshombe and CONAKAT .Thus avoiding the  
left wing nationalism of Patrice Lumumba threatening the neo-colonial economic arrangements 
accompanying decolonisation. 
Moves were quickly underway to ensure that Tshombe's new state received more European 
support. The chairman of Tanganyika Concessions and UMHK board member, Charles 
Waterhouse, the backbench right wing Tory MP, contacted the Foreign Office on 13 July. Until 
Alec Douglas-Home became Foreign Secretary on 27 July, Waterhouse and his fellow UMHK 
board member Lord Selborne
xxx
44  had to meet  with officials. He thus met E B Boothby from the 
Foreign Office as Belgian troops were taking over the airport in Leopoldville, which Boothby 
thought was a mistake, noting that they should return to their bases as requested by Lumumba and 
Kasavubu. Boothby also noted that the troops' purpose was not merely to protect lives but to impose 
a Belgian solution on the Congo.
xxxi
45 Waterhouse explained that his Brussels contact was telling 
him the directors of the Société Générale de Belgique, including most of the UMHK directors, had 
passed a unanimous resolution in favour of creating an independent Katanga as indispensable for 
the security of shareholders' interests. In London Waterhouse asked Boothby if Britain would 
pressure the Belgian government to act in accordance with the resolution of the Société Générale de 
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Belgique. Two days later Wigny summoned the British, French and American ambassadors in 
Brussels to tell them he hoped they would all give encouragement short of recognition to Tshombe's 
secessionist regime.
xxxii
46 By now , Lumumba, Kasavubu and 15 cabinet members had held a  four 
hour meeting with Ralph Bunche the personal representative of the UN Secretary General (SYG) 
Dag Hammarskjöld which resulted in an appeal to the UN for 'technical military assistance to help 
in organising, strengthening and training the national forces of the Congo for purpose of defence 
and the maintenance of law and order'.47 
xxxiii
  
In Leopoldville the British ambassador, with an overview of the disturbances, used to justify 
Belgian troops being sent to Katanga to shore up Tshombe’s secession, described them as definitely 
not an uprising of Africans against whites, but an uprising against Belgians and particularly the ones 
of Flemish origin.
xxxiv
48 The British Ambassador discounted all talk of plots, Russian intrigue or 
other extraneous factors in the uprisings which were not against foreigners but against the Belgian 
colonial regime.
xxxv
49 Scott thus refused to accept the 'deep laid communist plot' connection that 
Wigny was trying to make with the causes of the disturbances.
xxxvi
50 He was quite clear in 
explaining to the FO that the Belgians were 'not willing to accept a transition to the sort of 
relationship that Britain now enjoys with its former dependent territories' .
xxxvii
51 
When the Security Council met on the 13-14th July to deal with the newly independent 
government’s request for technical assistance to strengthen their national forces,  that request had 
been modified. The legitimate Congo government was now asking for troops to assist ‘against 
aggression’  because of the 'dispatch to the Congo of Belgian troops in violation of the treaty of 
friendship of June 29th. Under the terms of that treaty Belgian troops may only intervene at the 
express request of the Congo government....We accuse the Belgian  government of having carefully 
prepared the secession of the Katanga with a view to maintaining a hold on our country...The 
essential purpose of the requested military aid is to protect the national territory of the Congo 
against the present external aggression which is a threat to international peace' 52 In addition the 
Soviets were requested by Kasavubu and Lumumba to folllow the situation ‘from hour by hour’ as 
14 
 
14 
 
they could be brought to ask for Soviet intervention if Western aggression continued.53 However 
after the Security Council passed a clear resolution calling for the withdrawal of Belgian troops,   
the Soviet leader congratulated the UN on its response, with UN troops arriving on  that same day, 
thereby dealing with the imperialist aggression., Only  if the aggression continued would the Soviet 
Union see the need for more effective UN measures ‘on the part of the peace loving states’54. Here, 
in the form of possible Soviet action in support of a UN resolution, was the alleged  entry of the 
Cold War into the Congo crisis. The portrayal of that Cold War has generally been along the 
ortthodox or  ‘unreal’ lines of the West reacting to the Soviets without detailing the specifics of the 
Congo situation, but has nevertheless produced some dramatic interpretation by Western 
historians.55 
  The withdrawal of Belgium’s uninvited troops  made the UN’s credibility and Africa’s 
western alignment dependent on Belgian compliance with the resolution. Yet a withdrawal was 
precisely what the Belgians could not immediately do because the deployment of troops had been 
primarily designed to protect the secession and the benefits that Europeans and their African 
collaborators would secure from it. They informed the Americans that to comply with the resolution 
on withdrawal would adversely affect NATO's interests in retaining the bases at Kitona and Kamina 
56 A good indication of how the Belgians wanted to link the ‘unreal’ Cold War and decolonisation. 
       Decolonisation or neo-colonialism was becoming an important question. On the ground in the 
Congo this was represented in acute form by the issue of sending UN troops to Katanga. Trouble 
would then be likely to occur as the UN forces faced the possibility of confronting Belgian troops 
and resistance from Tshombe’s European and African supporters which would raise the spectre of 
more violence. An awkward Cold War scenario  was made worse by the Belgian government’s 
position. Hammarskjöld, although frustrated by the Belgian defiance, wavered on sending UN 
troops to Katanga  in the first week of August, but eventually declined to do so in the face of 
Tshombe calling the proposed entry into Katanga a declaration of war and promising resistance by 
all means.57  By then anoother security council resolution had been  passed, calling for Belgium ‘to 
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implement speedily the security council resolution of 14 July on the withdrawal of their troops’58. 
Britain and France abstained but  the US and the Soviet Union voted with the majority. Hence the 
value of misrepresenting reality and the Russian and communist threats as causes of the situation in 
order to justify the steps taken (or not taken) by the West as  reactions to Soviet machinations. In 
reality the Soviets were only reacting to what the Belgians were doing in the Congo by vaguely 
outlining what could happen if the aggression continued. What the Soviets actually did to help 
Lumumba before he was removed from power in September only ever amounted to  aid and 
equipment, albeit provided independently outside the UN as had been  stipulated.59 
.    For the Americans, securing the newly-independent-state’s unified sovereignty entitlement was 
important for the success of their African credibility in the Cold War, but this could bring them into 
conflict with the Belgians.  The Belgians did not withdraw their troops ‘speedily’  in line with the 
Security Council resolution on July 22
nd
  despite it authorising Hammarskjöld ‘to take all necessary 
action to this effect’.60  Thus, through a desire  to perpetuate key aspects of colonial rule. which 
would be badly received by most Afro-Asian states and those about to emerge from colonial rule, 
important Cold War disadvantages were likely to follow. Whether diplomatic pressure 
coulsuccessfully be applied  to change the Katangan situation was the moot point 61. In short  the 
advantages and disadvantages of neo-colonialism for particular members of the Western alliance 
had to be weighed against the ‘real’ Cold War advantages and disadvantages of a successful Congo 
decolonisation process in the battle for the hearts and minds of the inhabitants of the less developed 
world.   
 By now the viable choices for the US were r becoming  equally unacceptable , e how to 
portray and justify following a particular option was also problematic. The  effects of maintaining 
or removing an African secessionist state which was protecting the economic benefits of colonial 
rule for European shareholders were the crux of the matter. The British Government, like the other 
Western governments, could not overtly provide support for Tshombe or deny the legitimate, 
democratically formed government in Leopoldville the right to govern the former colonial territory 
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of the Congo.  International support for self-determination and a successful decolonisation process 
was too significant in the ‘real’ African Cold War  to be opposed openly. In this situation, four days 
after the first UN resolution and the Waterhouse intervention the British government had decided 
that its objectives  were a settlement between the (legal, democratically elected) government in 
Leopoldville and Tshombe's secessionist regime which had seized power in Elizabethville 'that 
preserves Western interests'. And to give this practical effect, the Foreign Office was to insist that 
no UN troops (which could end secession) should  be allowed  into Katanga 'as long as law and 
order prevails'.62 The Foreign Office decision, in effect to do nothing, meant no formal recognition 
of, nor overt support, for the Tshombe regime. Yet it also meant unofficial support for secessionist 
Katanga, through UMHK in particular 63, and the tacit acceptance of the advantages and benefits 
Tshombe's regime was providing for European capital.  The broader Cold War interests invloved in 
winning over the  newly independent states and their leaders to the cause of democratic capitalism 
under African control were less significant despite the broader Western interests in the general Cold 
War  being made several times by the Americans.64 
The Belgians with interests in the Congo sought repeatedly to conceal these interests by using the 
Cold War and blowing up the Soviet threat as  as an obvious smoke screen for their Katangan 
intentions. Scheyven, in the Belgian Washington Embassy argued that Khrushchev's response gave 
substance 'to this mounting Soviet threat' that could lead to World War III. Thus, according to 
Scheyven  it would not be appropriate for the West to suppress Tshombe's independence movement, 
as Katanga might become the only part of the Congo available to the free world.
xxxviii
65 Wigny  lost 
no time in adding new colours to the Cold War picture that the Belgians were painting in the 
Congo. He told the US, British and French ambassadors on 16 July that ‘Lumumba’s activities of 
the past few days .... have now made it clear that the Congo's problems must be looked at in the 
context of the East-West struggle
xxxix
66For the Americans  the East-West struggle centered on how 
to  preserve  Western opposition to communism without assisting Soviet appeals to the newly 
independent states.  Supporting European interests in the form of the Congo's exploitative colonial 
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capitalism   by Belgian troops did not look good. The alternative of not allowing the Belgians and 
their African supporters under Tshombe to defy the UN security council could be even worse as  it 
was increasingly looking as if this would have to involve supporting democracy in the form of the 
left wing nationalism of Patrice Lumumba.  
On 25 July, after the second Security Council Resolution, a CIA briefing for the National  
Security Council noted that apart from those in Katanga the Belgian troops had now withdrawn to 
the bases at Kamina and Kitona.67 Four days later the Belgian Cabinet decided that 1,500 troops 
could be withdrawn leaving 8,500 in the Congo bases against the wishes of the legiitmate 
government and UN resolutions. Despite Cabot Lodge, the US Ambassador to the UN  telling 
Foreign Minister Wigny in early August that the key to the present situation was the position of 
Belgian troops and they should announce a withdrawal date as soon as possible, Wigny said that 
was impossible. Lodge reacted by explaining that withdrawal of the troops was the West’s only 
chance of  preventing a Soviet victory in Africa 68. Thus , as Wigny informed the American that  
such unconditional actions could jeopardise his political career, the American UN Ambassador was 
analysising the relationship between neo-colonialism and decolonisation in the East-West struggle 
in terms of the disastrous effect of neo-colonialism on the Cold War in the Congo. Yet historians, 
ignoring the neo-colonial elements haveended to interpret  the Cold War as  a causal influence  
driving  the decolonisation process in Central Africa.  Meanwhile on 9 August, with the troops still 
not leaving the Congo, a third Security Council resolution now required the Belgians to withdraw 
them ‘immediately from the province of Katanga’.69 
The Eisenhower administration had initially hoped to use the UN to avoid appearing too 
close to the European colonial powers. The problem was that an appeal to Africans on the basis of 
traditional US anti-colonialism was problematic if an ally was supporting what seemed to be neo-
colonialism in the Congo in defiance of the UN.   The dilemma was heightened by the perceived 
importance of denying Katangan asssets to the Soviets but also denying them to the Congo 
government, as Tshombe was doing, could present a ‘funding and development problem for the US 
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and the UN’.  In a briefing paper for the National Security Council the Assistant Secretary 
responsible for the Bureau of African  Affairs, Joseph Satterthwaite, laid out the ambivalence of a 
desired US policy. It was to refuse to recognise Katanga 'while not closing the door completely in 
view of the possibility that the Katanga is all that can be salvaged for the West'.70 Thus there was no 
concerted effort to terminate the secession as the Eisenhower administration approached its end. 
Hammarskjöld’s dilemma was over maintaining  support for the West and preventing Soviet 
influence in Africa while cultivating the Afro-Asian bloc. The Secretary General, like many others 
in government, believed that Soviet influence and interest in Africa were much greater than they 
were. Moreover the West tended to assume the Soviets would pursue African goals  with vigour if 
the chance arose, rather than, as was actually the case,  with caution and incompetence that would 
always be likely to render  them ineffective.71 In addition, Hammarskjöld, despite his annoyance 
with the Belgians, would not fully condemn them for  violating  the  resolutions even though this 
was the very reason most likely to produce Soviet involvement if the UN did not cooperate with the 
legitimate government. It was becoming more and more obvious that the UN was not acting as an 
independent neutral force in the Congo but one which was actively working against the Lumumba 
government to prevent it  exercising more influence and acting against Katanga. 72     
Lumumba now foolishly decided to attack Hammarskjöld personally for failing to carry out 
the wishes of the UN by supporting the legitimate government in ending the secession and restoring 
the Congo’s territorial integrity. Khrushchev decided on a similar strategy of concentrating on 
Hammarskjöld and the UN. Rather than attacking the reasons for not upholding  the UN Security 
Council resolutions, his main aim seemed to be to use the crisis as a way of promoting a new 
tripartite, less partial, management of the UN and ensure that the dominant manipulation of it by the 
US and its Western allies was ended. If so it would indicate that Khrushchev was not too attracted 
by getting involved in an area of the world where Soviet power and influence was clearly lacking, 
and would be difficult and costly to change. By August 18th with troops in bases at Kamina and 
Kitona, Belgium's defiance of UN resolutions still remained a potential embarrassment. In 
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Elisabethville the US consul had been told by a Belgian military leader Major Guy  Weber of the 
business community’s plans to run Katanga, with Tshombe’s consent, through a white government 
behind the facade of  an African ministerial council.73 Be that as it may, the importance of 
preserving British and  Belgian   economic , even if the risk to Western Cold Wat reputations was 
considerable. The Americans remained ambivalent about it, but the danger of reputational damage 
would be  reduced if Lumumba became a communist and the ‘unreal’ Cold War could be used to 
justify Belgian actions and disguise the economc stakes.  Nevertheless it remained difficult to fight 
and justify any  Cold War with the myth of containing Soviet expansion when the Soviets were not 
supporting African revolutions but UN resolutions a member of NATO was in breach of.  
As August progressed  the stakes and the intractable nature of the dilemma increased as the 
situation in the Congo deteriorated especially after the third security council resolution on 9 Auguet. 
The force publique (ANC)  began arresting Belgians, and the State Department believed the soldiers 
‘could be incited to action against UN troops’. The possible reason for that was also noted in that 
the Belgians were ‘organising ABAKO and other elements to overthrow Lumumba’74. They were 
not the only ones, as both the UN and the CIA had began to seek ways to remove Lumumba. In a 
telegram of 11 August the station chief Larry Devlin informed the CIA that in the chaotic Congo 
situation unless Lumumba ‘was stopped’ he would establish a regime ‘under influence if not fully 
controlled by Commies’. Hence Devlin recommended steps to strengthen the Western position, 
including the provision of funds to bribe Congo politicians, especially in the Senate, to ‘take anti-
Commie line and oppose Lumumba’.75 However continuing to tolerate secession would lead to 
justified charges of neo-colonialism from the Afro-Asians in the UN just as the West’s relationship 
between the recently emerged and emerging African nations was going through  a delicate stage of 
decolonisation. Not to tolerate secession would  mean falling back on the left wing Lumumba, 
whatever the debates and divisions in the US administration over his communist or left wing 
nationalist sentiments. However remote the possibilities of Soviet control of the Congo,  relying on 
Lumumba would certainly mean the reduction of European economic benefits that the secession of 
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Katanga was providing. A potential double whammy which was clearly more related to  specfic 
Western interests and general embarrassment than to Soviet actions or geo-strategic considerations. 
The Congo position and the Cold War/decolonisation dilemmas were discussed by the 
National Security Council on 18 August. The most serious and troubling issue  was now  the threat 
of Lumumba seeking the withdrawal of UN forces. Two days earlier Hammarskjöld himself had 
stated that ‘the UN effort could not continue with Lumumba in office- one or other would have to 
go’76 This was another key stage in dealing with the problem, as the die was now cast for the 
‘elmination’ of Lumumba in order  to alleviate the Cold War/decolonisation dilemmas and avoid 
tackling the neo-colonial secession issue.President Eisenhower was adamant the UN had to stay, 
and  Dillon believed the situation that would be created by a UN withdrawal would be too ghastly to 
contemplate. The economic situation of both Katanga and  the Congo was discussed and tellingly 
Allen Dulles suggested it was important to preserve Katanga as a separate, viable asset.77 The 
Eisenhower administration still had one eye on its European allies. 
The one policy which would alleviate all Western concerns was the elimination of 
Lumumba, either by removing him from power or killing him..  A few days later Hammarskjöld 
was telling American UN representatives that Lumumba had to be ‘broken’78 More significantly 
Dulles was arguing that even if UN forces remained Lumumba would retain the initiative. In that 
case the Belgian presence, so it was argued, would become minimal as European settlers, including 
administrators, would leave. Whereas if Lumumba was removed that would open the way for ‘new 
arrangements’79. More amenable collaborators in the central government could then reconcile 
moderate/centre right African acceptance of elements of European capitalism, and more time would 
be available to reconcile the Tshombe government with Leopoldville while ending the Cold War 
embarrassment for the West..
xl
  
At least until this was done the  spin of the ‘unreal’ Cold War, which the Belgians had 
started by portraying the mutiny as a communist plot, now had to be encouraged in order to conceal  
Western, and specifically Belgian and British interests. Moreover the idea of 'eliminating' 
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Lumumba in line with  orthodox Cold War mantras based on keeping the Soviets out of Africa, 
united Hammarskjöld, some right wing pro-Western Belgians and the Macmillan and Eisenhower 
administrations in a common goal.  The first stage of the process  began when President Kasavubu 
was persuaded to dismiss him as prime minister.
xli
80  At the crucial moment in the removal process, 
troops in Stanleyville who were loyal to Lumumba were  prevented from flying to Leopoldville by 
UN troops occupying the city’s airport and being more than willing to interfere in the  Congo's 
internal affai rs in direct contravention of their assigned UN role.
 
81  
 With Colonel Mobutu, then governing through a non-parliamentary council of 
commissioners, Western unity began to crumble. For Hammarskjöld and his team,  believing in the 
importance of democracy in newly independent states, there was a greater need for the UN to be 
more sympathetic to the Afro-Asian bloc that appeared to be  increasingly disturbed by the relative 
priority accorded to capitalism over democracy by the West. Yet for the US this importance did not 
automatically extend to 20
th
 century European colonial capitalism. For the president elect  the latter 
was definitely seen as  preventing  a successful Cold War appeal to independent Africa based on the 
benefits that capitalism should  provide . Thus with the murder of Lumumba and Kennedy’s  
January arrival in the White House, things began to change. 
 Kennedy,   faced with the furore over Lumumba's death, called for a new Congo policy that 
included the return of parliament which was seen  as both a virtue and a necessity.
xlii
82 At the heart 
of this new policy was the Kennedy administration's greater interest in the  less developed African 
world and a more tolerant Cold War approach to the non-aligned states.
xliii
83 It embodied Kennedy’s  
virulent anti-communism  and a firm belief that the existing problems of the less develped world 
could be tackled and overcome. Kennedy aspired to a future in which the beneficial operations of 
capitalism, assisted by the state as in the New Deal, would bring a new and ultimately successful 
dynamic to the struggle between free enterprise and communism. This was an optimistic vision, in 
which Cold War success against communism would build a better world, notably for the less 
developed states that were throwing off the burdens of colonialism. The development process in 
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Africa would not be built on the colonial foundations of European capitalism, but on freer and more 
open competition, epitomised in  American values. Ensuring that democratic capitalism, influenced 
by these particular US values, would be welcomed by the newly emerging nations of Africa, was  
seen as the more positive and crucial Cold War task by the new administration. Whatever the 
importance of Latin America under Kennedy, it was Africa where the expected Cold War benefits 
of capitalist development and economic progress were most anticipated  because of  the more 
immediate contrast with colonialism. The process would produce the greatest challenge of 
decolonisation to be met by the values of New Frontier development with a role for progressive 
Europeans. For the  Americans,  left-wing forces   and the relics of colonialismwould risk the 
instability that would provide opportunities for the  unwelcome tenets of communism or its  
facilitators. The fact that instability in the less developed was generally produced more by the 
failures of,  or problems with, capitalism was not normally noticed in Westerm government circles.  
 The way in which European capitalism was expected to adapt to the Cold War the end of 
colonial rule in the Congo was central to Anglo-American differences during the Kennedy 
administration. .
xliv
84The contrast was  epitomised in social terms by some leading members of the 
Conservative party establishment and their associations with white settlers and Central African 
enterprises. They entertained Ambassador David Bruce at their clubs, and the American regarded 
such visits as an essential part of his ambassadorial duties. The views he encountered at these 
wealthy mens' institutions, frequented by leading right wing socialites  with their reactionary 
support of empire, were duly reported to the State Department.
xlv
85 In Washington, the Americans 
were simply informed by British Ambassador David Ormsby Gore, a close Kennedy confidante, 
that ‘Tshombe ran a much better show’ than the other Congo ‘governments’ that had appeared since 
independence.
xlvi
86 
 In August 1961 the establishment as prime minister in Leopoldville, with CIA financial 
assistance, of the former trades unionist, Cyrille Adoula, free from  radical nationalist influence, 
allowed attention to refocus on ending Katangan secession. s  A unified anti-communist Congo 
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state was seen in Washington as still vital  to the success of    in the ‘real’ Cold War. By now,  UN  
demands  the withdrawal of Belgian troops in Katanga had been superseded by the need to remove 
the mercenaries who had replaced them and become a vital part of Tshombe’s armed forces, or 
gendarmerie. Unfortunately for the British a new UN representative  in Elisabethville,  regard as. 
Conor Cruise O'Brien was not sympathetic to colonial attitudes. s As the UN representative in 
Katanga he  felt himself duty bound to use UN troops, now in Elisabethville, to remove Tshombe's 
mercenaries.in line with UN resoltions.
xlvii
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 The British Foreign Secretary was outraged once fighting started in late August 1961 and 
the Cabinet was told that UN local representatives were taking steps beyond removing Tshombe's 
‘military advisers’ (that is, the mercenaries). These steps, if they included removing civilian 
advisers, could be represented as interference in internal affairs and the Foreign Secretary, Lord 
Home, proposed to inform Hammarskjöld, who was killed shortly afterwards in a plane crash the 
circumstances of which were highly suspicious,
xlviii
88 that stability (and returns on investment and 
greater access to foreign exchange) in Katanga depended on maintaining the Tshombe 
administration – not a view that would be welcomed in Washington.  The British Cabinet saw 
dangers of disorder  and communism threatening the Congo, but, perhaps given British reticence 
and unspoken assumptions, nothing appeared to have been  noted about the more specific and 
serious threat to British financial interests. 
xlix
89. While the British may have influenced the 
Americans to exert pressure to end the fighting, yet another UN Security Council Resolution of 24 
November 1961 authorised the new Secretary-General, U Thant, to ‘take vigorous action including 
the use of force, if necessary, for the immediate apprehension.... of all foreign military and para-
military personnel not under UN command and mercenaries.’l90.  
 The second round of fighting in the Congo began on 5 December at Tshombe's instigation, 
as he hoped to seize the moment before UN forces had the opportunity to make the military 
preparations to implement Resolution 169 of 24 November. For Dean Rusk, the Secretary of State, 
the UN should not now be prevented from implementing its mandate as this ‘would destroy for 
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good the image of the US as a supporter of the UN's collective effort.’li91 The same conclusions had 
been reached by the US Ambassador, Edmund Gullion, in Leopoldville and by the National 
Intelligence Board in Washington.
lii
92 Rusk, however, was subjected to very different views from 
the British, French and Belgians.
liii
93 As Home and Macmillan prepared for a Commons debate on 
the Congo, Ball, acting Secretary of State in Rusk's absence, discussed the ceasefire proposal with 
Kennedy. He was eager to avoid ceasefires in the middle of implementing UN resolutions,
liv
94 while 
Kennedy was  prepared to accept a ceasefire only if  Tshombe agreed to discuss the re-integration 
of Katanga with Adoula.  The president’s idea was put to the Cabinet lv95 and  served to paper over 
the Anglo-American disagreements with  as the Kitona agreement was reached, in December 1961, 
on the principle of Katangan re-integration. But the Anglo-American Congo differences remained 
with Cold War implications as the requirements of European capital  could not be easily reconciled 
with independent African states.    
The practical details of implementing the Kitona agreement proved difficult as constitutional 
provisions for greater provincial autonomy and the incorporation of Tshombe's armed forces into 
the Congo army had to be arranged. Then the sharing of tax revenues and foreign exchange had to 
be decided with Robert Gardiner, now the leading UN civilian representative, playing the key role. 
As the French pointed out however, such  lengthy process were  unnecessary as nothing but money 
was involved
lvi
96. Therefore if the UMHK, rather than cooperating with Tshombe, could be made to 
apply pressure on him by paying taxes to the legitimate government, the secession would end. Not 
only would the UMHK and European investors suffer losses in the short term if it did, but Spaak  
would faced political difficulties from the Brussels supporters of Tshombe and UMHK.  Economic 
questions of Katangan re-integration into the Congo involved the same neo-colonial issues as the 
secession of 1960 with UMHK and Tanganyika Concessions remaining   at the heart of the  20th 
century ties between the colonial state and private enterprise. The  Belgian government had refused 
in 1960 to hand over its part-ownership of significant economic assets to the new state.  on 
independence. British income from  the days of King Leopold came not only from the UMHK and 
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the Comité Spécial du Katanga, as Tanganyika Concessions also had shareholdings in the 
Compagnie du Katanga (CK), which  were described by the Foreign Office as substantial but 
indeterminate.
lvii
97 A further  ‘neo-colonial’ element was the fact that the Belgian Government 
appointed four of the six directors of the CSK. who sat in Brussels. The situation was made more 
embarrassing by Tshombe cancelling the pre-independence agreement whereby the CSK was to be 
dissolved with . two thirds of the Comité's holdings going to the independent  government. Instead 
with secession, Tshombe appropriated  them for his Katangan state. Crucially for British 
government attitudes, Tshombe was now stating that he would destroy the dams that provided 
hydroelectric power to mining operations in Katanga in the event of UN actions involvimg  force. 
Ambassador Derek Riches was clear that any serious pressure on Tshombe would result in him 
destroying these major UMHK installations and thus the status quo should be accepted faute de 
mieux.
lviii
98  Yet with the UN likely to run out of money, as the US ambassador in the Congo  
pointed  out, something clearly had to be done. before the simple passage of time produced a 
Tshombe success 
lix
99 The Americans wanted to co-ordinate policies and their  implementation with 
Britain and Belgium, hoping  the Belgians could provide much needed expertise  through French-
speaking technicians..
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 As a result a  May tripartite meeting, was held in London,  chaired by Lord Dundee, a FO 
Minister of State, whom Ormsby Gore described to the Americans as ‘a fool.’lxi101 The crux of the 
secession problem was whether forceful measures could be agreed that would get Tshombe to take 
irreversible steps to re-integrate Katanga into the Congo. The issue  was so important to Kennedy 
that he sent a personal letter to Ambassador Bruce emphasising that time was running out. While 
the Americans wanted a peaceful re-integration, if Tshombe remained obdurate ‘we must be 
prepared to pursue actions which could involve the UN in the use of force.’  Tshombe had to be 
disabused of the notion that this would never happen and Bruce should make sure that those with 
financial interests got the message that the failure to re-integrate Katanga into the Congo would be a 
commercial disaster.
 lxii
102 A few days earlier, Sir Brian Urquhart had explained to the Americans 
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why the Congo was seen as so important in London.  Urquhart was a former FO official,  appointed 
by Hammarskjöld as one of his advisers  in 1953. He explained  that the reason for  Anglo-
American differences was not simply the relationship between the Foreign Secretary and the 
Chairman of Tanganyika Concessions, but that the lack of British enthusiasm for Katangan re-
integration was the result of the governmental influence of the Conservative Party's chief financial 
backers who 'almost to a man were the principals in Tanganyika Concessions'.
lxiii
103.
lxiv
     
 The two-day tripartite meeting began on 15th May, with the chair emphasising Home's 
concerns about the 'disaster' that might result if punitive measures were taken against Tshombe. 
Wayne Fredericks, the American Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, pointed 
out, following Kennedy’s line, that, as part of the key US goal of agreeing on how best to apply 
pressure on Tshombe and overcome his delaying tactics, the disaster resulting from the failure to re-
integrate would be equal to the destruction of Katanga.  The neo-colonial Katangan issue now 
boiled down to whether pressure should be applied to Tshombe to end the secession and the benefits 
it brought to European investors and their  African supporters ors, and if so in what ways. Or 
whether reintegration  could and should be secured with the freely given consent of Tshombe. An  
interesting Cold War difference between  Lumumba’s situation and Tshombe’s was that, whatever 
their respective legitimacies or legalities, the former's removal/elimination because of his left-wing, 
nationalist views could enable different Western concerns to be fused into an anti-Soviet crusade.  
In mid-1962 the British were arguing that the use of force would produce chaos, as the collapse of 
the Tshombe government would lead to communism or the UN taking over Katanga; while the 
Americans countered that it was ruling out force that would lead to chaos by bringing about the 
collapse of the Adoula government and opening the door to a communist take-over of the 
Congo.
lxv
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  At the tripartite conference,  the Belgians drafted a paper in an unsuccessfully attempted to 
bridge the gap between the British and the Americans.  Dundee  had been instructed by Home to 
oppose any measures that might lead to hostilities. Any such  resolution would be vetoed and the 
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UK would probably withdraw its financial contribution to the UN’s Congo operations.lxvi 
105
lxvii
With no further progress being made, Bruce concluded correctly at the end of the conference 
that the State Department would be unable to accept the points of agreement.
lxviii
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 Letters 
exchanged between Macmillan and Kennedy on 25 May and 1 June could not however paper over 
the Anglo-American cracks as the Americans found any form of Katangan autonomy 
unacceptable.107 The British government asked the Kennedy administration not to reveal the extent 
of the disagreement between Washington and London. Privately the Americans believed that the 
reactionaries in UMHK were 'hiding behind the skirts of British directors from Tanganyika 
Concessions'1089 The determination to put Tanganyika Concession's interests in the Congo before 
the cultivation of good relations with Washington left the Americans in no doubt that Tanganyika 
Concessions was significantly more hard line than UMHK.   Bruce noted  that London only wanted 
to achieve re-integration of the Congo if the 'stability of mining operations, and revenues dependent 
on them [could be] preserved'.109 With Spaak seen in Washington as more amenable than the 
British, the Americans and Belgians agreed on a programme to escalate gradually the pressure on 
Tshombe through measures increasing the risk of force. Washington was still eager, before risking 
force or applying economic sanctions on Tshombe, to reach a common Western position, but 
Britain remained at odds with the US interpretation of events.
lxx
 On 27 June, the American-Belgian 
proposals  for the re-integration of Katanga were put to the UN which led to the August 1962 
agreement on the UN Reconciliation Plan drafted in the State Department. The British were thus 
left on the sidelines as mere recipients of information and nearing their 1950s nightmare of 'now 
being classed with the French' in the Congo crisis.
lxxi
110 However as the US hesitated over the 
implementation  of measures to apply pressure on Tshombe, UN representatives in the Congo 
became more significant in the ending of secession..
lxxii
  
 The first of several consequences was that the use of force by the UN which removed 
Tshombe  did not damage  the interests of European capital through destroying  UMHK 
installations.  The second consequence was a false dawn produced by  the success of the Kennedy 
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administration in removing the original stain of neo-colonialism.  A pyrrhic ‘real’ Cold War victory 
over those Europeans in Brussels, London and Katanga who were unwilling to abandon the 
economic benefits of colonialism, failed to enable the people of the Congo to embark on any viable 
long term developmental future. Despite Harland Cleveland leading an investigatory team set up by 
Kennedy to produce an economic development path for the Congo which, like the general ‘new 
frontier’ approach, was fundamentally optimistic both about problems to be faced and, oddly, the 
resource provisions to overcome them. Cleveland and his team, during their three week stay in the 
Congo, were to consult with the UN the Belgians and the British ‘on the nation building phase  the 
Congo was now entering’111   The albeit excessively idealistic focus was on the domestic economic 
situation, with the key nation building component of conventionally analysed decolonisation 
processes also subsequently accepted uncritically by historians. One key domestic aspect of 
decolonisation in the Congo was, by any measure, the enormous economic mess that had been 
produced in the first three years of independence. Conventionally, the causes are deemed to lie 
more in the dilatoriness and lapses of the Belgians, which allowed for Soviet meddling, than in 
deliberate attempts to prevent the Congolese inheriting the economic fruits of power other than in 
the form of large  debts. Some of the mess was clearly the result of Katangan secession which was 
designed to preserve the colonial advantges of the European production of copper by  minimising 
the economic disdadvantages of independence.. How much the economic mess had been produced 
by colonialism, secession and neo-colonialism, Soviet aid or, internal domestic rivalries will always 
be a  matter of dispute. The internal dislocation  had interrupted most aspects of domestic and 
international trade within and between the Congo and its neighbours, thus seriously hampering the 
developmental  process. In other words getting newly independent African nations to ‘stand on their 
own two feet’ in the international economy became even more difficult and was not achieved even 
with the end of secession. Not least because of  the UN’s  departure  and Tshombe’s return  as 
leader of the  reintegrated Congo in 1964. The result was the the contentieux  were not resolved and 
29 
 
29 
 
it took the nationalisation after Mobutu’s second coup finally to remove all the benefits from 
Europeans. 
In terms of decolonisation’s  links to the Cold War, the CIA in January 1963 made the 
connection, or rather the lack of one, between the internal situation in the Congo and Soviet 
involvement.  There had always been an element within both US administrations prepared to play 
up in a sinister way  or exaggerate the actual Soviet desire for influence or subversion in the Congo, 
while ignoring the likelihood of its  realisation. However the CIA was now clear that there had 
never been, as they claimed the Soviets had realised, any effective means of intervention by 
Moscow in the Congo. This would not stop the Soviets offering assistance to benefit from 
opportunities to increase their influence, but significantly the CIA believed, in submissions for the 
national intelligence estimates, that the Kremlin did not regard the Congo as a central problem 
because the Soviet stake was small and involved ‘neither vital interests nor a commitment of 
prestige’.112 
 Decolonisation for Europeans with investments or employment in the Congo was a dfferent 
story as it certainly involved interests in a specific and concrete form. These were unusally 
significant because of  the interconnection between the colonial state and private economic 
interests. These ‘business interests’ either in the form of trade or the operations of extractive 
industries have primarily been dealt with in the decolonisation literature without distinguishing 
between ‘business’ in the form of the operations of  trading companies and those of  extractive 
industries on the one hand (aka the real economy), and on the other hand, particularly in the British 
case, the more important interests of financial capital, and in Central Africa the operations of the 
London metal market in the City along with the role of investors. For the Europeans in Katanga and 
UMHK and its shareholders and directors, the benefits from Tshombe’s neo-colonial state were not 
just in the form of paying taxes to the Elisabethville regime rather than Leopoldville, but getting 
greater access to foreign exchange and avoiding having undesirable left wing African 
representatives on their boards as replacements for the colonial states’s representatives. 
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 The connections to Cold War perceptions and the causal influence on policies  throughout 
the crisis stemmed more from these financial interests and their protection than from Soviet actions. 
But it was more convenient to blame problems and their causes on the Soviets once explanations for 
European policies had had to be provided. Doing so would not involve  a thorough analysis of  how 
absorption into the international capitalist economy might damage the ability of a new state to 
2overcome any handicaps left, deliberately or not, by a colonial regime. Thus the ‘unreal’ Cold War 
was used by important Western policy makers both to justify and obscure the Congo’s problems 
and the Belgian defiance of UN resolutions. In the British case initially to do nothing that could 
threaten the continuance of the economic benefits produced by colonialism by acting against a right 
wing anti-commuist regime was a conscious policy choice clearly influenced by the Foreign 
Secretary’s social contacts within the Conservative Party. The economic strength of Tanganyika 
Concessions board members  and how that was used to finance Conservative electoral interests  
may have been particularly significant.  
Only 11 days after independence, Katangan  secession was declared on the assumption of 
Belgian military intervention supporting it with troops. The Brussels government justified the 
intervention because of disorder and attacks on Europeans  following a mutiny which they claimed 
the Soviets were behind. Tshombe justified it  by alleging  neo-communists formed the legitimate 
Leopoldville government.113 Hence cause and effect were gradually reversed in the portrayal of the 
‘unreal’ Cold War in the Congo. The Soviet Union, like many African countries and Lumumba 
were  playing more of a reactive than an initiating role by responding to the Belgian defiance of UN 
resolutions. The latter threatened to tarnish the end of colonial rule which had to be presented by the 
West, particularly the US with its less tangible economic interests, in ways that avoided  damage to 
their position in the ‘real’ Cold War. 
Unfortunately  the SYG’s increasing desire  to strengthen ties with the emerging 
independent states could not easily be reconciled with failing  to maintain the unity of the 
independent left wing Congo state.  Nor, in the ‘real’ Cold War, could the prestige to be gained 
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from the ending of colonialism and the western allegiance of newly independent states be 
reconciled with the preservation of the profits of European capitalism courtesy of Tshombe’s 
regime. Unlike the ambivalent Eisenhower adminstration, the Kennedy White House argued that 
winning the ‘real’ Cold War in Africa required some significant modification of the profits  from 
colonial capitalism for the broader gain of securing African allegiance to a  liberal capitalist 
economic order.  
The old colonial economic order and its African supporters were directly assisted by the UN 
under Hammarskjöld in order to avoid an undesirable left wing regime and the threat of Soviet 
inflence, despite the UN  masquerading in the form of  a neutral SYG spinning non-interference in 
the Congo’s internal affairs. From July to mid-August with the Belgians refusing to withdraw 
troops completely, the  role of the UN, whether or not as a surrogate for the US, was itself in danger 
of being undermined.  By the time  it became obvious at the end of August that Lumumba had to be 
‘removed’, Hammarskjöld remained  furious with the Belgians for  refusing to tell the truth about 
their lack of withdrawal from Congo bases, although he believed that the Belgian Foreign Office 
was not responsible for ‘Belgian lies on withdrawal’.114  As September approached,  the unpalatable 
choices were  not just between splitting the Western alliance, or  actively supporting a legitimate 
left wing nationalist regime threatening European economic interests; nor even about acting to 
remove an illegitimate right wing one, but were inherent in a deteriorating Congo situation  in 
which a legitimate government was deemed likely to request the removal of a UN force. This was 
the situation that finally lifted the constraints on implementing the informal American-UK-UN 
agreement to remove Lumumba. 
It is difficult to provide causal explanations linking decolonisation to the ‘real’ Cold War in 
Africa by using the specifics of the exceptional Congo circumstances. Hence the historians’ need 
for the ‘unreal’ Cold War to justfy the policies of the West, which for some European ministers and 
officials,  were  less about ending  empire in the Congo than about protecting colonial econmic 
benefits on independence. Hence the importance of portraying Soviet actions and fears of Soviet 
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actions as communist subversion despite there being no strong communist party anywhere in 
Central Africa. Nevertheless with limited Soviet interest in the Congo and even less capability to 
expand that into significant influence in Africa, it has generally succeeded in distracting attention 
from the neo-colonial desires to continue profiting from investments in the mineral rich Katangan 
province. 
 Kennedy's assessment of Africa's ‘real’ Cold War importance proved particularly  
unwelcome to the British government. Despite the somewhat precarious US-UN- British-Belgian 
alliance  initially wobbling, it was preserved by the removal of the left wing Lumumba which 
avoided some more unpalatable  options. Only when Tshombe’s, as opposed to Lumumba’s, 
removal proved contentious did the consequences of disagreements within the Western alliance 
become serious.
lxxiii
   As tacit European support for neo-colonialism looked like strengthening  left 
wing African nationalist forces under Lumumba, it became necessary to  create  perceptions of pro-
communist nationalism, and use the ‘unreal’ Cold War Soviet threat to promote Westerm unity and 
render neo-colonialism of secondary importance. When the ‘real’ Cold War assumed pride of place 
under Kennedy, ironically the British  noted that the communist threat to Africa was being 
exaggerated by the Americans.
lxxiv
115 . In the end the Kennedy administration won the ‘real’ Cold 
War in the Congo but more long lasting than the pyrrhic Cold War victory was the impact on the 
UN.   
As the  UN's decolonisation operations in the Congo ended, there were  too many African 
states for Washington to manipulate the UN effectively which was why Johnson had less time for it. 
He also had much less time for Africa and Africans than Kennedy, especially given the divisions 
within the Organisation of African Unity which immediately emerged after 1963. In the Congo the 
collateral economic damage could not be remedied by  Kennedy’s developmental idealism  driven 
by government help to private enterprise and states free from colonialism. Whether the economic 
damage has come  more from  the exposure of the Congo to the market forces of international 
capitalism, or from  attempts to  retain colonial  economic advantages   will remain open to debate. 
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The desire to use  the ‘unreal’ Cold War to obscure the reasons for Western policy whether 
in Brussels Washington or London has not helped an understanding of the decolonisation process 
itself. With the historiography often using the Cold War as a catch all of anything and everything, in 
so doing it  fails to specify which of the many constituent parts of the Cold War are being referred 
to. As a result  it has rarely come to terms with the Cold War’s relationship with decolonisation or 
neo-colonialism in the Congo. Thus the true importance of  the specifics of the neo-colonial Congo 
relationships or  the Cold War’s decolonisation footnotes, have.tended not to feature in the 
significant and substantive works on the end of colonial rule. 
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i
 1  Ronald Hyam first introduced the idea of this Cold War/decolonisation relationship at a BDEEP seminar nearly 
twenty years ago. . For the increased importance of the ‘real’ Cold War (meaning the different priorities actually given 
to its constituent parts by US administrations))  in the less developed  world and non-alignment under Kennedy and 
Johnson see  Odd Arne Westad Global Cold War: Third World Interventionism and the Making of our Times 
(Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2005), Robert McMahon (ed)  The Cold War in te Third World (New York 
Oxford University Press 2013); and Robert B Rakove Kennedy, Johnson and the Non-aligned World (New York 
Cambridge University Press 2012). The broad  extent of the Cold War revealing its many constituent parts is well 
covered in the three volume  Melvyn P Leffler and Odd Arne Westad  (eds) The Cambridge History of the Cold War 
(Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2010).  For a useful  summary of those interpreting the Cold War as a clash of 
social systems and the other emphases on culture and ideology with the role of see Federico Romero  ‘Cold War 
Hiistoriography at thr Crosswords’ Cold WarHistory14 4 (2014). Recent collections of themes and regions in the Cold 
War following the Cambridge History – ie Petra Goedde and Richard H Immerman (eds) TheOxford Handbook of  the 
Cold War (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2013) and Artemy M Kalinsky and Craig Daigle (eds) The Routledge 
Handbook of the Cold War (Abingdon  Routledge 2014) have articles entitled Cold War and Decolonisation.. Neither  
have helped significantly to  link decolonisation with the Cold War through tthe specifics of archival research despite 
the articles specifically entitled Decolonisation and Cold War. The excellent  and interesting article of Ryan Irwin 
‘Decolonisation. and Cold War’ in the Routledge volume  is a conceptual exercise analysing  the 20th century  
relationship between broad themes of empire, colonialism and imperialism only a part of which touches on 
decolonisation .  Cary Fraser’s similarly titled article in Petra Goedde and Richard H Immerman (eds) The Oxford 
Handbook of  the Cold War (New York Oxford University Press 2013) is a general overview written within a 
conventional decolonisation framework starting with World War I.  Jason Parker deals more with specifics with the 
Congo’s decolonisation  being ‘consumed by the Cold War’ Jason C Parker ‘Decolonisation, the Cold War, and the 
Post-Columbian Era’ in Robert J McMahon (ed) The Cold War in the Third World (2013) 132.  There are also two  
recent articles on the Cold War in the Third World, one  in the McMahon volume and Michael Latham’s article in the 
Cambridge history of the Cold War. The latter  article begins after  the Katangan secession ended and  is also based on  
secondary sources but nevertheless succeeds in accurately tracing some links between the specifics and the general and 
covers the Kennedy administration and the Congo.  In the McMahon volume the Cold War in the Third World two 
articles, dealing with the Third World as an addendum  to China and culture and the Cold War are provided by Chen 
Jian and Andrew Rotter.  Aritcles on the Cold War in Africa are provided by Jeffrey Byrne for both the McMahon and  
Routledge  volumes  with the first dealing effectively with decolonisation’s role in the  re-inforcing of of sovereignty 
and the state system and the second providing a  potted history of the African  Cold War crises from World War  I 
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dealing briefly with the Congo.  It includes factual errors and avoids almost entirely the use of published and 
unpublished documentary sources . The different views of these authors all see the Cold War as  influencing indigenous 
movements, or as  the Cold War failing to have a significant effect on such movements that were allegedly determined  
to prevent the decolonisation process being tarnished by the Cold War. All neglect  the economics of  the relationships 
in Africa as important influences on the Cold War’s relationship to decolonisation. Paradoxically, Soviet Third World 
policy in the second half of the fifties is starting to be seen as influenced by economics and  financial capitalism. See 
Oscar Sanchez-Siibona The Political Economy of the Soviet Cold War from Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge 
Cambridge University Press 2014) 
ii
 2 In addition to being a key figure in the British Documents on the End of  Empire (BDEEP) series editing singly or 
jointly several volumes and their respective parts  in two of the general  BDEEP series A edited by Steve Ashton., 
Ronald Hyam  has also produced by far and away the best book on British decolonisation in R Hyam  Britain's 
Declining Empire The Road to Decolonisation 1918-1968 (Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2007). Its excellent 
prose combines well with the knowledge that he has been able to gain from a study of more British documents on the 
end of empire than any other academic. 
3 Kennedy, even as a US senator   was interested in, and concerned with the Cold War implications, (not just  the US 
domestic political implications), of the less developed world, and particularly of an African continent seeking to find 
ways to escape from European rule. ‘He wrote scornfully of the…popular American “ill-conceived and ill-concealed  
disdain for “neutralists” and “socialists”  who, in fact, represented  “the free world’s strongest bulwarks to the seductive 
appeal of Peking and Moscow”. Robert B Rakove op cit 32 using John F Kemnedy ‘A Democrat Looks at Foreign 
Policy’ Foreign Affairs 36,1 (1957). Hence the importance of Africa and the Congo when Kennedy became president. 
He set aside time to meet numerous African leaders and potential leaders in the White House including left wing ones ie 
Keita, Nkrumah, Touré and Nyrere. The Bureau of African Affairs, only established in Eisenhower’s second  term, 
contained 3 Offices and 18 desk officers  when Kennedy entered the White House. Sixteen months later it had expanded 
to 5 Offices and 26 desk officers and according to the FO matched the European Affairs and Inter American Affairs 
Bureaux  for size  National Archives Kew (TNA) FO371/161374 JDB Shaw (Washington Embassy) to KM Wilford 23 
March 1962 
4 See John Kent ‘US Reactions to Empire, Colonialism and  Cold War in Black Africa 1949-1957’ Journal of Imperial 
and Commonwealth History  (33,2,May 2005) 
5 Information on the financial situation and economic resources of the Congo are both lengthy  and detailed in the State 
Department papers many of which initially drew on  the academic assistance of  MIT in the form of  Robert West who 
compiled a number of detailed reports on the Congo’s economy available in the Kennedy Presidential Library and the 
36 
 
36 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
State Department’s Central File. They provide the basic analysis  of the Congo’s economic position used here. West 
was a former analyst with the Federal Reserve Bank in New York and on the part time staff at Yale University.  Prior to 
indepencdence he was on a study mission to the Congo  for  MIT. As such he helped the UN negotiate the  liquidation 
of the Belgian Congo’s Central Bank (Banque Centrale du Congo Belge et Ruanda Urundi), which with the help of the 
IMF  had, by the start of 1961, established a body known as the Monetary Council of the Congo to try and bring order 
to the chaos of foreign exchange transactions, partly produced by secession. That chaos was  reflected in an unknown 
loss of foreign exchange and non-payment for imports, the lattter of which was reckoned to constitute $24 million in the 
second half of 1960. Subsequently West  worked as a  specialist on African problems for the Rockefeller Foundation, 
again visiting the  Congo, and in 1963 became a Counsellor for Economic Affairs in Leopoldville and  provided reports 
directly to Harlan Cleveland the Assistant Secretary for International Organisation Affairs in the State Department. In 
December 1962  when the issue was taking measures to end secession, Cleveland  referred to the danger of the US 
being seen, (given the British and Belgian actions and inactions), as having a desire ‘to protect the arbitrary and 
imposed tax and profit system of a mining company’. For Cleveland, after an African country [the Congo] had achieved 
independence, these profits were widely regarded as constituting  ‘a prototype of an exploitative imperialist-capitalist-
monopoly.’ An appropriate definition of the economic results of neo-colonialism.  Cleveland went on to head a team in 
February 1963 to produce a report for Kennedy  based on three weeks in the  Congo supposedly  in consultation  with 
the British and the Belgians on how the nation building of the reintegrated state should proceed. John F Kennedy 
Presidential Library (JFKL), Harland Cleveland Papers, Box 68 Cleveland to Ball (personal)  14 December 1962. His 
report is in JFKL, Harland Cleveland Papers, Box 69 Memo for the President ‘Harlan Cleveland’s Report on the 
Congo’ Feb 1963 
6 Because of the intertwined mix of concessionary, holding and operating companies in the workings of European 
capitalism in the Belgian Congo, Tanganyika Concessions benefitted  from financial stakes in a number of  different 
companies including the Société Générale de Belgique and the Comité Spécial du Katanga.See fn 11 
7 The details of  asset transfers to the independent Congo became known as the contentieux to be discussed after 
independence essentially because the belated Belgian commitment to colonial development in the Congo had been 
financed by bondholders whose returns  in the form of  interest on that debt  were to be paid for after independence , 
thus at the very least providing some Belgian leverage when or if asset transfers were discussed. 
8 Sir Brian Urquhart supplied the US with this information as an explanation for the lack of British government support 
for  Katangan reintegration. National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) College Park RG 59 Central 
Decimal File (CDF) 770G:00 1960-63 Box 1965 Tel 1477 State Dept to London 19 Sept 1961  
37 
 
37 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
9 TNA FO371/161517 de Boulay (Washington Embassy) to Foster  Sept 1962. It was estimated by the FO that the 
value of Tanganyika Concssions’  interests in UMHK  was £80 million 
10 TNA FO371/161516 Sir J Nicholls to Roger Stevens 6 March 1962 
11 Another feature of colonialism in the Congo was that the operating companies extracting mineral resources from the 
concessionary lands deposited share-securities to the domainial authority ie the company owning the concessions from 
Leopold. – in souther n Katanga primarily the CSK. Thus royalties were not  paid to the  colonial state because of the 
original land having ‘belonged ‘ to Leopold  and then to a combination of the Belgian Congo state and private firms. 
Conventionally in the Congo it was the dividends paid on these shares that served as royalties. For Tanganyika 
Concessions this meant until  1962 they were paid in the form of dividends to shareholders  The CSK collected such 
dividends for the Belgian Congo government and the shares went into the Congo Portfolio, which before and after 
independence was controlled in Brussels. The Portfolio was  a mix of shares and  parastatals with the latter often 
operating at a loss. See John  Kent, America, the UN and Decolonisation:Cold War Conflict in the Congo p81 fn 116 
12 Ganshof van  der Meersch  Fin de la Souveraineté Belge au Congo 191-299 (1963) 
13 TNA FO371/176725 GE Milard to Sir Roderick Barclay 27  Feb 1964 
14 See the assessments of the new British Ambassador  Ian Scott (former consul-general) of the post-mutiny 
disturbances   in TNA FO371/146639. This is not to say that these neo-colonial plans for the support of secession were 
hatched in Brussels rather than by settlers and Belgian officials in Katanaga. I am grateful to Emmanuel Gerard for 
pointing out that Belgian Cabinet records indicate that government opinion was divided until Lumumba broke off 
relations in mid-July 
15 JFKL Harlan Cleveland Papers Box 70 West  Report for G Mennen Williams ‘Financial Groups in  the Congo’ 22 
Dec 1961 
16 JFKL President’s Office Files  (POF) Box 114 Airgram Brussels to S of S 13 Mar 1962 (source giving the info to the 
Ambassador  redacted) 
xvii
 17 See especially John Kent Anglo-American Diplomacy and the Congo Crisis 1960-63: the Not So Special 
Relationship in John W Young, Effie G H Pedaliu and Michael D Kandiah (eds) Britain in Global Politics Volume 2 
From Churchill to Blair (2013)   
18 
 For details on this I am grateful to the work of Per Axel Frielingsdorf for his Ph D thesis on Hammarskjöld's role as 
UN Secretary General and his 1960 actions in the Congo. 
19 This applies to the original 'nationalist' model put forward by A Low. A broader international perspective was 
outlined by John D Hargreaves  and by the ideas of Ronald Robinson and Wm Roger Louis  represented in ‘The 
Imperialism of  Decolonization’  Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History Vol 22 ,3 (1994) before the work of 
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new generation historians of decolonisation was added to the new work of ‘old’ imperial historians. The arguments of 
Robinson and Louis about Anglo-American cooperation over the renewal and subsequent disinvestment of the British 
Empire effectively covers the 1950s. The criticism of Nigel Ashton in ‘Anglo-American Revival and Empire during the 
Macmillan Years 1957-1963’ in Martin Lynn (ed)uses the  Middle East with the  colonial aspects centering  on Guiana 
and the Congo ie post-1960. While Ashton correctly identifies more clearly the Anglo-American conflicts he casts the 
Congo into the conventional end of Empire framework based, in the Congo’s case, on the over-rapid transfer pf power.   
20 Nigel J Ashton ‘Anglo-American Rivalry and Empire during the Macmillan Years 1957-1963, in Martin Lynn (ed) 
the British Empire in the 1950s: Retreat or Revival? 171         
21 JFKL Harlan Cleveland Papers  Box 69 Robert West to  Cleveland 30 Jan 1963 
22  Dwight D Eisenhower Library (DDEL) White House Office Files, Office of the Staff Secretary (General 
Goodpaster), International Series, Box 4, Tel 58 Brussels to S of S 8 July 1960; TNA FO371/146639 Leopoldville to 
FO 14 June 1960. Ambasador Scott pointed  out that not a single Belgian had been seriously hurt in Leopoldville, the 
town quite close to the mutiny at Thysville camp, which was sparked by the lack of pay for extra indepemdence day  
duties and the European CO telling the men that nothing would change with independence.  When refering to the 
reasons for the mutiny and the sending of  of Belgian troops,  Scott discounted ‘talk of Soviet plots’ as the uprising was 
against colonial rule and a consequence of the feeling that ‘Belgium was here to stay’  - with Belgian flags still flying 
after independence TNA FO371/146646 Leopoldville to  FO 18 July 1960; TNA FO371/146642 Account by Sir J 
Nicholls of events in the Congo 10 July 1960;   Nicolas J White Decolonisation the British Experience (2
nd
 ed) 2014)  
95-96                                                                                                                  
xix
23 Work on the Special Relationship as a general guiding light for  Anglo-American relations continues to flourish 
without taking into account the nuanced qualifications centred on the attractions and conflicts  provided by the British 
Empire in both the pre- and post-war years. See the recent article by John Baylis and Steve Marsh  'Anglo-American 
Relations 1950-51: Three Strikes for British Prestige', Diplomacy and Statecraft 23.2 (2012) which still uses Churchill's 
3 circles as part of a consistent aim of British foreign policy, albeit if it was to be achieved by different means. One FO 
official is used to justify the 1944 view that Britain was now abandoning the policy of balancing British power against 
that of America and  the detailed FO report of Graham Spry after a 1943 tour to gauge US opinion of the British empire 
as part of an assessment of the general difference of American views within and outside Washington is ignored. Nigel 
Ashton by focussing on ‘interdependence’, or the lack of it, provided a more sophisticated assessment of the 
cooperation and conflict with reference to the British  Empire. 
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24  While there has been an increased willingness to link the two, the number of academics who have specialisations 
and research monographs in both these areas is limited, thus helping to produce more orthodox or superficial coverage 
in one  of the two areas  
25 The UN Security Council meeting of July13/14 followed Belgian troops taking the port of Matadi on 11 July with 
some loss of African life, and the landing of paratroops on the Leopoldville Airport on 13 July JFKL  POF Box 114     
Policy Paper ‘An Analytical Chronology of the Congo Crisis’  2 May 1961. This was not a briefing paper but a policy 
paper designed to permit a review of the Congo crisis. 
26 The neglect of the influence of economics and financial capital in the decolonisation process precedes  the 
acceptance of the Washingtom comsensus and the Panglossian impact of the ‘free’ market  
 
xx
27 The new breed of English language historians of decolonisation also tend  not to mention the Congo to any 
significant degree –or to present a distorted picture. See for  example  Nicholas J White Decolonisation the British 
Experience  (1999) and more particularly 'The Business and the Politics of Decolonisation: the British Experience in the 
Twentieth Century' Economic History Review 53, 3 (2000). Sarah Stockwell however argues that British policy was 
more accommodating of business interests. Sarah  Stockwell (2004) 'Trade, empire, and the fiscal context of imperial  
business during decolonization' Economic History Review, 57, 1 (2004). See also LJ Butler 'Business and British 
Decolonisation : Sir Ronald Prain, the Mining Industry and the Central African Federation'  Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History 35, 3 (2007); Andrew Cohen ‘Business  and Decolonisation in Central Africa Reconsidered’ 
Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 36,4 (2008) White deals briefly with the Congo and notes the dinner 
companionship of Home and Waterhouse, but is incorrect in saying Britain accepted US policy in 1962 (which it never 
did), as illustrated by the Nassau 'arguments' on the Congo and the British refusal in 1962 to support all the measures 
which the State Department drafted for the UN and which formed the basis of the UN Reconciliation Plan in that year. .  
Philip Murphy’s BDEEP volumes Series B Vol 9 Central Africa Parts I and II (The Stationary Office 2005) do give the 
Congo more than a passing reference as does Alan James  Britain and the Congo Crisis but the latter essentially deals 
with the Congo as an appendage to the story of Britain and the UN.  Murphy deals with Waterhouse, Tanganyika 
Concessions and the Congo investments accurately in Party Politics and Decolonisation pp 111-116 drawing attention 
to the lack of Waterhouse’s influence on Foreign Office officials  BEFORE Home, whom Waterhouse was closely 
connected  to socially, became Foreign Secretary on 27 June 1960. He also refers to the subsequent cooperation over 
approaches  to Tshombe. While pointing out that it was ‘difficult to argue that the business background of Conservative 
politicians was a major determinant of their general attitude to political change in Africa’. (p117). The crux of the 
Congo issue is really the way owners of capital in general acted there where the issue was not influencing the 
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formulation of British colonial policy but ensuring a ‘do nothing’ British foreign policy towards neo-colonialism in 
(with or without commercial business activities) an independent Congo. A’do nothing’ policy was less likely to  result 
in losses to the owners of that capital when  action would  have threatened the main financial contributions to the 
Conservative party. 
28 While such statements heard in a French bar are unlikely ever to be heard in a UK equivalent, you would also be 
unlikely to hear a UK government minister comment (putting aside the degree of veracity) in private, as Couve de 
Murville did: ‘it is well known that the Société Générale [de Belgique] is in the control of the Belgian government’. 
NARA RG59 CDF 770G:00 1960-63 Box 1973 Tel 1973 Paris to S of S 11 July 1962. The other side of the coin is that 
you would never see a British businessmen spit on a European official amidst accusations of criminality over policy 
disagreements. NARA RG59 CDF 770G:00 1960-63 Box 1955 Tel 349 USUN to S of  S 10 Aug 1960  
xxi
 29 See Jacques Marseille Empire colonial et Capitalisme français:Histoire d’un Divorce (Paris:Albin Michel 1984) 
and Guy Vanthemsche Belgium and the Congo 1885-1980 (University of Nebraska Press Lincoln NE 2012). Work on 
the Congo and decolonisation is still dominated in Europe by J  Stengers  Congo mythes et réalités:100 ans d'histoire 
(Paris and Louvain-la Neuve: Duculot 1989); 'Precipitous Decolonisation: the Case of the Belgian Congo' in Prosser 
Gifford and Wm  Roger Louis (eds) The Transfer of Power in Africa:Decolonisation 1940-1960 (New Haven: Yale 
University Press 1982). The  recent multi-archival work on the Congo crisis of the early 1960s  by Lise Namikas 
focuses primarily on the Cold War element Battleground Africa Cold War in the Congo 1960-1965 (Washington DC: 
W oodrow Wilson Centre Press 2013). The linguistic skills and the excellent use of non-English sources are  somewhat 
offset by the weaker analyses of the colonial elements of the Congo situation  and an orthodox interpretation of the Cold 
War as a key policy determinant of the imternational players. 
30 Lumumba’s character and  political beliefs were much discussed and not only in Washingtom.  Initially Lumumba 
was not portrayed as a communist, and it was the disorders that were depicted as communist inspired but that 
interpretation was provided by the Belgian Foreign Office. The Americans, the further away they were from direct 
contact with or particular knowledge of the Congo eg members of the National Security Council as opposed to the 
Congo Embassy officials under Eisenhower  and  Kennedy  (with the exceptionof the CIA’s chief of mission in 
Leopoldville), had a greater proclivity to ascribe Lumumba as a communist or as manipulable by communists . 
Members of the State Department, with more direct knowledge  were as late as  mid-Aug portraying  Lumumba as  
‘moving  left’ but ‘probably not firmly communist oriented’. But ‘at any event it appears doubtful  that Soviets, any 
more than US,could, under present conditions in Congo, establish reliable continuing influence’.NARA RG59 CDF 
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